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Abstract
Although it has been claimed that people care more about identiﬁable than statistical victims, demonstrating this
“identiﬁable victim effect” has proven difﬁcult because identiﬁcation usually provides information about a victim,
and people may respond to the information rather than to identiﬁcation per se. We show that a very weak form
of identiﬁability—determining the victim without providing any personalizing information—increases caring. In
the ﬁrst, laboratory study, subjects were more willing to compensate others who lost money when the losers had
already been determined than when they were about to be. In the second, ﬁeld study, people contributed more to a
charity when their contributions would beneﬁt a family that had already been selected from a list than when told
that the family would be selected from the same list.
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People react differently toward identiﬁable victims than to statistical victims who have not
yet been identiﬁed. Speciﬁc victims of misfortune often draw extraordinary attention and
resources. But, it is often difﬁcult to draw attention to, or raise money for, interventions
that would prevent people from becoming victims in the ﬁrst place. For example, when
Jessica McClure (“Baby Jessica”) was trapped in a well in Texas, over $700,000 was sent
to her family for the rescue effort (Variety, 1989). If those donations had instead been
spent on preventative health care for children, hundreds of children’s lives could potentially
have been saved. As Schelling (1968) noted in a seminal article on what has come to be
known as the identiﬁable victim effect, the death of a particular person invokes “anxiety
and sentiment, guilt and awe, responsibility and religion, [but]...most of this awesomeness
disappears when we deal with statistical death.”
Schelling’s comment points to an intuitively plausible psychological account of why
identiﬁablymatters.Itsuggeststhatidentiﬁablevictimsstimulateamorepowerfulemotional
responsethandostatisticalvictims.However,thelimitedamountofresearchthathassought
to better understand the identiﬁable victim effect has not supported such an account.
JenniandLoewenstein(1997)identiﬁedfourpotentialcausesoftheidentiﬁablevictimef-
fectandconductedstudiestoteasethemapart.Mostobviously,identiﬁablevictimsaremore
vivid than statistical victims (see Nisbett and Ross, 1980), especially when details about
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them are communicated—e.g., pictures, family information, and so on. Second, identiﬁ-
able victims are certain victims, whereas statistical victims are, by deﬁnition, probabilistic.
Researchonriskydecisionmakingsuggeststhatpeopleareloss-averse—theydislikelosses
muchmorethantheylikeequivalentvaluedgains(KahnemanandTversky,1979).Ifsaving
astatisticallifeisseenasagain,butsavinganidentiﬁedvictimisseenasavoidingaloss,then
thispredictsthatpeoplewillplacegreatervalueonidentiﬁedvictimsthanonstatisticalones.
Third, evaluation of an identiﬁed victim is made ex post—i.e., after the event has
occurred—whereas the evaluation of a statistical life is made ex ante. Ex post evalua-
tion makes blame and responsibility much more salient, and risk perception can depend on
the saliency of blame (Douglas, 1992). Attribution of blame is less clear in the ex ante case
since it is impossible for people to predict and take on responsibility for all the tragedies
that might occur. This third cause is closest to the one that Schelling implicitly attributed
the identiﬁable victim effect to, and is close to the cause we examine in this paper.
The fourth cause, and the one that has received the greatest empirical support, is the
reference group effect. People feel greater concern toward victims as the reference group
they are part of grows smaller (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1980). For example, a
disease that kills 100 people out of a group of 100 is seen as a calamity, but one that kills
100 people across the country is experienced as much less disturbing. Identiﬁable victims
represent the most highly concentrated distribution of risk (an n of n) because identiﬁable
victimsbecome,ineffect,theirownreferencegroup.Incontrast,astatisticallifehasamuch
larger denominator, because the risk is typically spread across a large population.
JenniandLoewensteinfoundonlyweaksupportfortheﬁrstthreeexplanations,butstrong
support for the fourth explanation involving the proportion of the reference group saved.
Similar results were obtained by Featherstonhaugh et al. (1997) and Baron (1997) and all
were reported in the same issue of the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, which was devoted
to the problem of valuing human life.
The idea that the identiﬁable victim effect is “just” a reference group effect is somewhat
surprisingandseemstoconﬂictwithSchelling’scompellingintuitionthatthereissomething
special about identiﬁed victims that causes us to react to them in a more emotional fashion.
Even if the reference group effect can help to explain the identiﬁable victim effect, it seems
difﬁcult to accept that this is the whole story.
Several psychological theories suggest that people use distinct processes to make judg-
ments of speciﬁc as opposed to general targets (Hamilton and Sherman, 1996; Sherman,
Beike, and Ryalls, 1999). Dual-process models in social psychology suggest that peo-
ple become more mentally, and emotionally, engaged when they process information
about speciﬁc individuals than when they process information about abstract targets. The
central-peripheral model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic-Systematic model
(Chaiken, 1980) both can be applied to the perception of and reactions to victims. These
dual-process models suggest that speciﬁc instances are more involving to the perceiver.
Speciﬁc cases, such as identiﬁable victims, are thus more likely to receive greater cognitive
attention, and deeper consideration. Abstract cases, including statistical victims, are less
emotionally involving, and judgments of them are more likely to be made on the basis
of peripheral or heuristic cues. The differential functioning of separate processes helps
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qualitativelydifferentfromknowingthatyoucouldhelponeofmanypossibleneedypeople.
The victim is more emotionally gripping than a victim regardless of the size of the refer-
ence group. Based on our doubts about the former “reference group effect” conclusion, we
decided to conduct a more focused test of the effect of identiﬁability.
Testing for an effect of identiﬁability is difﬁcult because it is hard to manipulate identi-
ﬁability without altering other factors at the same time. Perhaps the biggest problem is to
identifyvictimsinanymeaningfulfashionwithoutrevealinginformationaboutthem—e.g.,
theirgenderorage.Assoonasonerevealsspeciﬁccharacteristicsofthevictim—eveninfor-
mation as trivial as a name—it is possible that people feel especially sympathetic to people
with those characteristics. Once identifying information is provided, it is possible that the
speciﬁc characteristic rather than the identiﬁability of the victim per se is responsible for
any differential response one observes.
In the studies presented here, we avoid this problem by manipulating a particularly weak
form of identiﬁability, determination of the recipient of help, that avoids conveying any
information about the victim. Statistical victims are indeterminate in the sense that the
people who will become victims have not yet been determined. Identiﬁable victims, in
contrast, are determined. The victims’ identities have been determined, whether we learn
anythingabouttheiridentity.Wehypothesize,therefore,thatevenifwehavenoinformation
about the persons, determined victims will be perceived as more tangible and hence evoke
greater sympathy. Indeterminate victims, in contrast, are more difﬁcult to imagine and
empathize with, and hence one is less likely to behave toward them in an altruistic fashion.
1. Lab experiment
Our ﬁrst study uses a specialized version of the “dictator game” to provide a quantitative
measure of altruism. In the standard version of the game an “allocator” is presented with
an endowment and then given the opportunity to split the endowment with an unknown
“recipient.” Although economic models which assume selﬁshness predict that allocators
will keep the entire endowment for themselves, in fact many allocators give a positive
amount (see Camerer and Thaler, 1995, for a review of ﬁndings). Of special relevance to
the current study, Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996) varied the design of the dictator
game in various ways, including permitting communication between the allocator and the
recipient. They found that individuals who communicated with one-another became more
other-regarding, and posited that it had this effect because it reduced the perceived “social
distance” between the players.
Bohnet and Frey (1999) examined one aspect of social distance that is especially closely
related to identiﬁability. They conducted a version of the dictator game in which different
subjects played either (a) completely anonymously, (b) with silent identiﬁcation, and (c)
withface-to-facecommunication.Theyfoundthatrelaxinganonymitywhilestillforbidding
dialogue was sufﬁcient to increase other-regarding behavior. Note that relaxing anonymity
is somewhat different from pure identiﬁability as we have deﬁned it. First, in the context
of their studies, it introduces the possibility that one will interact with the individual in
the future, and that such interaction will be affected by the recipient’s knowledge of the
dictator’s behavior. Second, as discussed above, it introduces the possibility that any effect8 SMALL AND LOEWENSTEIN
is due to the speciﬁc identities of the linked pairs as opposed to the mere fact that they
are identiﬁed. Nevertheless, the results are certainly consistent with our prediction that
determining the person to be helped increases generosity.
In our ﬁrst experiment, we modiﬁed the dictator game to produce a situation in which
fortunatesubjectswhoretainedtheirendowmentcouldcontributeaportionofitto“victims”
who had lost theirs. The main manipulation in the study was whether the identity of victims
had already been, or was about to be but had not yet been, determined. We hypothesized
that determined victims would receive more money.
1.1. Method
Seventy-six undergraduate students at Carnegie Mellon University participated in the study
in exchange for research participant credit and whatever sum of money they earned from
the game. Subjects were recruited in groups of ten, and were randomly assigned as a block
to one of the two conditions (determined or undetermined). They were seated in cubicles
facing away from one another and were instructed not to speak or turn around and look at
one another during the course of the experiment. The experimenter informed the subjects
that all decisions they made would be anonymous and that, at no point during or after the
experiment, would anyone learn the identity of anyone they were paired with. At the end of
theexperiment,subjectsweretoldthattheywouldreceivetheirpaymentsfromtheoutcome
of the allocations in sealed envelopes, so that they would only learn the outcome of their
own allocation, and no one else’s.
At the beginning of an experimental session, each subject was given an envelope with
$10.00 in the form of 40 paper tokens worth $0.25 each. Subjects were informed that the
tokens were equivalent to real money and that those they retained at the end of the game
could be exchanged for cash. The experimenter then circulated the room with a bag of
pieces of paper labeled with a number from 1–10, and each subject drew a number.
Each subject then received the following written instructions:
The actual experiment requires that half of the participants begin the task with $10.00 in
paper tokens, but that half begin with nothing. To create this situation, each person will
drawacardfromthebag.Halfofthecardshavetheword“KEEP”onthem,andtheother
half have the word “LOSE” written on them. If you draw a “KEEP” card, you keep your
paper tokens. If you draw a LOSE card, put your number card and your tokens in the bag
when the experimenter comes to you.
The next part of the instructions differed subtlety for those in the determined and unde-
termined conditions.
In the determined condition, the instructions read:
Each “KEEP” participant will now be linked with one “LOSE” participant. If you are a
KEEP participant, you will draw one of the “LOSE” participant’s numbers from the bag.
Please do so now and write it on the following line. I am linked with number .
If you are a “LOSE” participant, write an X in the blank.HELPING A VICTIM OR HELPING THE VICTIM 9
In the undetermined condition, the instructions read:
Inamoment,eachofthe“KEEP”participantswillbelinkedwithone“LOSE”participant
by having the “KEEP” participant draw one of the “LOSE” participant’s numbers from
the bag. Before we do that, however, we have a decision for you.
For participants in both conditions, the instructions then continued:
KEEP participants: If you are a “KEEP” participant, you now have the opportunity
to allocate your $10.00 endowment between yourself and the “LOSE” participant. The
decision that you make is ﬁnal. That is, all of the tokens that you allocate to yourself are
yours to cash in at the end of the experiment. Likewise, the LOSE participant you have
been linked with will cash in whatever tokens you allocate to him/her. Remember, the
roles assigned and your decision will be anonymous. No one will ever learn that you are
a KEEP participant, you will never learn the identity of the person you are linked with,
and none of you will know how much money each participant takes home.
Please put the tokens you would like to give the participant you are linked with in the
manila envelope. Also, write your decision in the following blanks:
Keep for self
Give to linked participant
$10.00 TOTAL
LOSE participants: Put these instructions back in the white envelope and seal it.
At this point, the instructions in the undetermined condition said:
Now, we will draw the number of the LOSE player you will be linked with. Please draw
a number from the bag and write the number here .
Finally, KEEP participants in both conditions were told to put the tokens they were
keeping for themselves in the white envelope with their instructions sheets and to seal the
envelope.
As the instructions indicate, the only aspect varied between the two conditions was the
time when an allocator drew the number of the recipient: before making an allocation in
the determined condition and after making an allocation in the undetermined condition.
The experiment was implemented exactly as speciﬁed by the instructions. There was no
deception; payment was determined as described to the subjects.
1.2. Results
Ourmajorhypothesis,thatAllocatorswouldgivemoremoneytorecipientsinthedetermined
condition than in the undetermined condition, was supported. The results are reported in
Table 1.
Because the contributions were not distributed normally, we analyzed the difference
between the two groups with a Mann-Whitney non-parametric test, which conﬁrmed that10 SMALL AND LOEWENSTEIN
Table 1. Summary statistics of allocations to undetermined and determined recipients
in the lab experiment.
Undetermined victim Determined victim
Condition (n = 37) (n = 39)
Mean $2.12 $3.42
Standard deviation $1.79 $2.51
Median $1.81 $3.81
Mode $2.00 $5.00
Percent of $5.00 (or greater) offers 18.9% 46.1%
Percent of $0.00 offers 18.9% 15.4%
subjects gave signiﬁcantly more to victims who had been determined prior to the allocation
task than to victims who were yet to be determined (Z =− 2.3, p = 0.02).
From the last two rows of the table, it is apparent that the determination manipulation
affected the magnitude of donations to victims but not the tendency to make any donation
at all. There was a striking difference between the two groups in mean, median and modal
contributions,butvirtuallythesamefractionofsubjectsineachconditiongavesomepositive
amount.1
Figure 1 presents histograms of giving in the two conditions, which reinforces the obser-
vation that the major difference between the two conditions is in how much subjects gave
rather than whether they gave. The ﬁgure also shows that contributions were not normally
distributed.
Figure 1. Comparison of allocations to undetermined and determined recipients. Donations are rounded to the
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1.3. Discussion
This study provides evidence for the effect of identiﬁability on altruism. The results are
especiallystrikingbecausethe“victims”inourstudywere,inthegeneralschemeofthings,
not particularly disadvantaged—they had simply missed out on the opportunity to gain
a $10 windfall—and the determination manipulation was subtle. If such a weak form of
identiﬁability can produce such a dramatic difference in altruistic behavior it seems likely
that variations of identiﬁability will produce even more dramatic effects in naturalistic
situations in which, for example, one usually does obtain at least some information about
identiﬁablevictims.Nevertheless,suchaneffectcannotbeassumed,whichiswhywechose
to conduct our follow-up study in the ﬁeld.
2. Field experiment
In our second study, potential donors were presented with a letter requesting money to buy
materialsforahousethatwastobebuiltforaneedyfamilythroughtheHabitatforHumanity
organization. The letter described several families on the waiting list to move into homes.
Identiﬁability was manipulated by informing respondents that the family either “has been
selected” or “will be selected” from the list. In neither condition were respondents told
which family had been or would be selected; the only difference between conditions was
in whether the decision had already been made.
2.1. Method
At public places around Pittsburgh, including the airport and shopping centers, people were
approached and 234 individuals consented to ﬁll out a survey on an unrelated topic for
$5.00 pay. When they ﬁnished the survey, each was presented with 5 one dollar bills, a
returnenvelope,andaletterfromHabitatHumanity.2 Participantsweretoldthattherequest
was entirely separate from the survey just completed. They were asked to read the request,
regardless of whether they thought they would be interested in donating the money that
they had earned, and to return the envelope, sealed with their receipt and any amount of
the $5.00 they chose to donate, even if they were giving nothing. The survey administrators
were blind to the hypothesis and unaware that the charity request letter came in two forms
thatwererandomlydistributedamongthesurveys.Thetextoftheletterinthe“determined”
condition, with alternative wording for the undetermined condition presented in brackets,
was as follows:
Several families have applied to help build and purchase a home for themselves. Habitat
protects the conﬁdentiality of applicants, but here are brief descriptions of the families,
names excluded:
1) A single dad who works as a painter. He has two kids: his 8-year-old lives with him
and he pays child support for another child.
2) A single mom who lives with her 3 children and her disabled father. Her kids are ages
4, 2, and 5 months.12 SMALL AND LOEWENSTEIN
3) A single mom who is on disability. She lives with her 2 children: a 12-year-old and a
20-year-old who is also on disability.
4) A single mom with 4 kids: ages 14, 11, 11, and 9. Her current home is plagued by
infestation, a leaky roof, birds in the attic, and high gas bills.
Eighty percent of the money raised will go directly toward building materials for the
construction of the next house; the rest goes to administrative costs. Pittsburgh Habitat
hasalreadydecided[willdecide],basedonneed,whichofthefamiliesjustdescribedisin
themostneed,andthatfamilywillmoveintothehousebuiltbyCMUstudentsandfaculty.
The family that Habitat chose [will choose] will participate in the building of their new
home. If you would like to donate any of the money that you received for ﬁlling out your
questionnaire to help build a home for the family that habitat has chosen [will choose],
pleaseputitintheenvelope.Wedonotwantyoutofeelpressuredintogivingsofeeltostep
aside from the researcher, put what you choose of your $5.00 in the envelope, and return
it to the researcher, sealed, regardless of whether, or how much you have contributed.
2.2. Results
As in the previous study, we predicted, and found, that contributions would be larger when
the recipients had already been determined than when they were yet to be determined.
Summary statistics for the study are presented in Table 2.
Whether measured by mean, median or mode, donations were larger in the determined
condition than in the undetermined condition, and the differences is signiﬁcant by a Mann-
Whitney test (Z =− 1.99, p = 0.05). Moreover, unlike the previous study, more people in
the determined family condition gave anything at all (69.5%) than when the family had not
beendetermined(56.9%),againasigniﬁcantdifference(χ2(1) = 3.99, p = 0.05).Figure2
presents a histogram of the results.
One possible alternative interpretation of the results is that respondents might have con-
strued either the organization or the potential recipients differently based on whether or not
Habitat for Humanity had yet selected the recipient of the home. It is possible that respon-
dents might infer that the organization is less trustworthy to carry through with its plans, or
thatthefamilythatwillbechosenwillbelessdeserving,ifthemoneyisbeingraisedbefore
Table 2. Summary statistics of allocations to undetermined and determined
families in the ﬁeld experiment.
Undetermined family Determined family
Condition (n = 116) (n = 118)
Mean $2.33 $2.93
Standard deviation $2.31 $2.25
Median $2.00 $4.00
Mode $0.00 $5.00
Percent of $5.00 offers 38.8% 49.2%
Percent of $0.00 offers 43.1% 30.5%HELPING A VICTIM OR HELPING THE VICTIM 13
Figure 2. Comparison of donations to undetermined and determined habitat for humanity families receiving aid.
a beneﬁciary has been chosen. To test these potential alternative accounts of the results, we
conductedabriefsurveytoexplorewhetherpeopleconstruedthesituationdifferentlyinthe
two conditions. We presented a separate sample of 42 undergraduate students at Carnegie
Mellon University with the charity request letter (half received the determined family con-
dition and half received the undetermined family version) and asked them to respond to the
following questions on 7-point likert scales:
1) How likely do you think it is that money donated will actually go to building a home for
a needy family; and
2) Assuming such a home is, in fact, constructed, what is your best guess of the neediness
of the family that receives it.
There were no differences across conditions in the responses (p = 0.74; 0.69 respec-
tively). Mean responses to question 1 were 5.7 for the unidentiﬁed condition and 5.8 for the
identiﬁed condition, and for question 2 were 5.6 for the unidentiﬁed condition and 5.7 for
the identiﬁed condition. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the effect we observed resulted
from different interpretations of the situation.3
2.3. Discussion
This ﬁeld study provides even stronger support that identiﬁability of the victim affects
altruism. By moving out of the laboratory, we eliminated potential artifacts such as the
concern that students might have felt of being “found out” by their peers or other non-
empathetic motives. By collecting money for a real charity to help people truly in need, we
illustrate the real world implications of this effect.
3. General discussion and conclusions
Incombination,thesetwostudiesprovidenewevidencesupportingtheexistenceofaniden-
tiﬁablevictimeffect.Theweakformofourdeterminationmanipulationshows,furthermore,14 SMALL AND LOEWENSTEIN
that the effect is not due to speciﬁc information that people receive about victims (although
that can be a contributing factor). Although reference group size may again be a contribut-
ing factor in the real world, even when one holds the reference group size constant, there
remains an effect of identiﬁability.
Although we conjecture about the cause of the effect, and speciﬁcally speculate that
identiﬁability affects the way that people think about, and emotionally react to, victims, our
studies provide no evidence that these are the actual mechanisms that produce the effect.
Futureresearchcouldtestformediationbymeasuringemotions,orbyexaminingtheimpact
of inducing or suppressing speciﬁc emotions.
Another possible contributing factor is that determined victims provide more salient
reasons to act. Shaﬁr, Simonson, and Tversky (1993) maintain that many decisions are
driven by arguments or reasons, rather than value-based calculations of options. Thus, in
one study, some subjects were asked to imagine that they had agreed to take a wager that
gave them a 50–50 chance of winning $150 or losing $100 and had lost, and were asked if
they would like to play again. A majority said that they would. Others were told that they
had taken the wager and had won; again they wanted to play again. However, when they
were told that they had accepted the ﬁrst wager but had not yet played, a majority said that
they did not want to play again. Apparently, actually resolving the uncertainty initiated a
line of reasoning that subjects did not spontaneously engage in when the uncertainty was
not resolved. In future research it would be interesting to test whether statistical victims
similarly evoke different arguments or reasons from victims that have been identiﬁed.
In ongoing research, we are attempting to generalize these results beyond the impact
of identiﬁability on empathy for, and altruism toward, victims. If it is true that simply
determining a victim increases helping by reducing the psychological distance between the
self and a victim, then it is possible that determining a target other than a victim could have
an impact as well. Victims are victims because they are not responsible for their situation
andthusevokesympathyandpity(Weiner,1980).If,instead,apersoninneedisconsidered
responsible for their adverse situation, then the resulting emotions might instead be anger
and disgust. Anger follows from the belief that another person “could and should have done
otherwise,” and the emotion diminishes our inclination to help this person (Weiner, 1995).
If we feel greater pity for a victim who has been determined, it might be the case that
we feel stronger anger toward a determined target who caused and is responsible for their
predicament.Thereforethe“determinedvictimeffect”behindidentiﬁabilitymaysimplybe
onecaseofamoregeneral“determinedothereffect,”inwhichanydeterminedtargetevokes
a stronger emotional reaction than an undetermined target. Future research should explore
the range of other social judgments and behaviors that are moderated by determination.
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Notes
1. Therewasnosigniﬁcantcorrelationbetweentheamountgivenandsubjects’ownnumbersorthenumberofthe
recipient with whom they were paired as might have been expected if subjects had anchored on their numbers
(R =− 0.131, p = 0.3; R = 0.089, p = 0.5, respectively).
2. Therequestfordonationwasgenuineandallinformationintheletterwasfactual.LettersweretypedonHabitat
for Humanity Pittsburgh letterhead and the families described were real people on the waiting list to receive
homes. All donations were given directly to the organization.
3. Inthefollow-upsurveywealsoexploredpotentialmediatorsoftheeffectofidentiﬁability.Wesoughttodiscover
whetherthedeterminationwasevokinggreaterempathyandresponsibilityforandimageryofthevictims,which
in turn was driving the result. We asked the following questions: (1) When thinking about the family, did you
imagine what it would be like to be in their situation without a decent home? (2) How sympathetic are you
toward the family? (3) How personally responsible do you feel for the family? Respondents who had read the
charity request from the determined family condition answered these questions similarly to those who had read
the charity request from the undetermined family condition (p = 0.12; 0.67; 0.61, respectively). Therefore,
we cannot make inferences about the psychological processes driving our result. However, this null result is
not entirely surprising considering that people are less likely to be emotionally engaged when hypothetically
considering a charity, rather than contemplating the real choice of giving up money (see, e.g., Van Boven et al.
2001).
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